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Law and Investment in Africa 
 
 
 
Abstract 
  
 This paper sets a new tone in the legal origins debate with the overwhelming dominance 
of French civil-law countries in private investment: contrary to mainstream consensus where-in, 
English common-law countries are better at championing private property rights (La Porta et al., 
1998; Beck et al, 2003). Findings are premised on much recent data (1996-2007) from 38 
African countries. The study investigates how French, English, French sub-Saharan, Portuguese 
and North African legal origins shape domestic, foreign, private and public investments through 
law channels of regulation quality and the rule of law.    
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1. Introduction 
  
 The legal origins debate has been largely focused on the law-finance (growth) nexus. 
This territory has been widely explored since the pioneering work of La Porta et al.(1998b). Over 
the past decade investment in African countries has substantially dropped in comparison to the 
1970’s. Given the close connection between investment and economic growth (Barro, 1991; 
Ben-David, 1998), and the substantial efforts undertaken by these developing countries to attract 
investment, the continent is lagging behind in comparison to Asia and Latin America. Many 
determinants of investment have been assessed in the continent. Corruption (Ndikumana and 
Baliamoune-Lutz, 2008) has been found to have negative and positive effects on private and 
public investments respectively. A plethora of financial development indicators have also been 
found to positively impact domestic investment (private and total investments) in Africa 
(Ndikumana, 2000). Factors such as political and macro economic instability, low growth, weak 
infrastructure, poor governance, inhospitable regulatory environments and ill-conceived 
investment promotions strategies have been identified as responsible for the poor Foreign Direct 
Investment (Dupasquier and Osakwe, 2005).  Sustained efforts to promote political and 
macroeconomic stability and implement essential structural reforms have been the key elements 
contributing to the success of certain African countries in attracting high levels of Foreign Direct 
Investment (Basu and Srinivasan, 2002). In spite of all this literature, a study dedicated to 
assessing how legal origin affects investment via channels of law remains an important missing 
link; which is the object of our paper. This missing link can further be emphasized by the 
presently questionable Anglophone-edge in the legal origins debate (Asongu, 2011abc). Thus in 
this paper, we attempt to explore the effects of law on investment dynamics in the African 
territory. We empirically examine if regulatory-quality and the rule of law differ across 38 
 4
countries in the continent. In other words we assess how law channels are exogenous to 
investment dynamics and whether legal origins influence investment beyond the mechanism of 
law channels.  Deviating from the French, English, Scandinavian and German legal origins 
expressed in pioneering literature (La Porta et al., 1988b; Beck et al., 2003), we club legal 
origins in Africa into five categories, namely: French, English, French sub-Saharan, Portuguese 
and North Africa.  This starting point is the implicit recognition of substantial differences in 
these legal families originating from English common-law and French civil-law traditions 
(Asongu, 2011b).  While he assumed that the basic origin of laws is clear, he nonetheless 
postulated that consistent with the amendment of laws over time (La Porta et al., 1998b), the 
African continent is no exception1. Findings in this work could be appealing to both policy 
makers and researchers in substantially shedding some light on certain concerns that have 
remained hitherto unaddressed: (1) whether there are exceptions to the dominance of English 
legal origins in certain dynamics of investment; (2) why certain countries still reflect very low 
levels of foreign and private investments despite substantial efforts to effect these; (3) if beside 
the law channel, African countries have other substitutes or mechanisms via which legal origins 
could account for investment ; (4) whether the use of much recent data provide findings that set a 
new tone in the legal origins debate2. 
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following manner. We complete the 
introductory section with a literature review on the legal origin theory, why it matter and its 
current scope in the law-finance nexus.  Section 2 provides some perspectives on law channels 
and investment theory. Section 3 describes data sources and outlines the methodology 
                         
1
 For instance Ecuador, a French civil-law country revised its company law in 1977 to incorporate some common-
law rules; Europe’s Italy is a French civil-law country with some German influence; some Japanese laws were 
Americanized after  World War II, Thailand’s laws were based on common-law but have substantially been 
influenced by French civil-law.    
2
 Verily, the paper uses data collected after pioneering works on the law-finance nexus to assess hypotheses 
resulting there-from in the context of Africa. 
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respectively. Cross-country regressions and discussion are respectively presented and reported in 
Section 4. We conclude with Section 5.  
 
1.1 The Legal Origin Theory 
The Legal Origin Theory upon which this work is based traces the different strategies of 
common and civil law to different ideas and strategies about law and its purpose that England 
and France developed centuries ago. These broad strategies and ideas were fitted into specific 
legal rules, but also into the organization of the legal system, as well as the human beliefs and 
capital of its participants. With acquisition of new territory and colonization, human capital, 
legal ideologies and rules were transplanted as well. Despite much legal evolution and 
amendment of law over time (La Porta et al., 1998b) the fundamental strategies and assumptions 
of each legal system survived and have continued to exert substantial influence on growth and 
development. This theory may be summarized in one sentence from Zweigert and Kötz(1998): 
“the style of a legal system maybe marked by an ideology, that is, a religious or political 
conception of how economic and social life should be organized”(p.72). This work seeks to 
assess how these styles of different legal systems have survived over the years and continued to 
exert substantial influence on aggregate investment factors through law dynamics in the African 
continent. The new approach of classifying legal origins into English, French, French sub-
Saharan, Portuguese and North African countries provides an exhaustive and thorough insight 
into an African view of the legal origin debate: until now unexplored. For clarity and 
organization, the literature pertaining to this paper will be classified into two main strands: why 
legal origin matter in economic performance and the scope of the law-finance nexus. 
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1.2 Why does legal origin matter in economic performance? 
For clarity purposes literature that has been dedicated to addressing the concern of why 
legal origin matter in economic performance could be classified into three main categories. 
 In the first strand, several papers consider ownership of particular economic activities and 
government regulation.  Djankov et al.(2002) observe the number of steps an entrepreneur must 
complete in order to begin operating a business legally, a number for instance that in 1999 varied 
from two in Australia and Canada to twenty-one in the Dominican Republic. They investigate 
the impact of such entry regulation on corruption and the size of the unofficial economy. 
Djankov at al.(2003a) assess government ownership of the media which remains extensive 
around the world, especially the television. Botero et al.(2004) construct indices of labor market 
regulation and investigate their impact on labor force participation rates and unemployment. 
Mulligan and Shleifer (2005a, 2005b) assess one of the ultimate forms of government 
intervention in private military conscription.  
 The second strand of papers assess the effects of legal origins on the features of the 
judiciary and other government organs on the one hand, and on the hand the effects of those 
(features of the judiciary) on the security of property rights and contract enforcement.  Djankov 
et al. (2003b) probe into the formalism of judicial procedures in various countries and its effects 
on the time it takes to evict a nonpaying tenant or to collect a bounced check.  This factor can be 
given a wider interpretation as the efficiency of contracts enforcement by courts and indeed turns 
out to be significantly correlated with the efficiency of debt collection mechanism by Djankov et 
al. (2006). La Porta et al. (2004) adopt a very different procedure and gather data from national 
constitutions on judicial independence and the acceptance of appellate court rulings as a source 
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of law. They inquire after if judicial independence contributes to the security of property rights 
and the quality of contract enforcement.  
 In the third strand, several studies in the aftermath of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998a) 
assess the effects of legal origins on investor protection and then the impact of investor 
protection on financial development. Some literature pertaining to this strand assesses stock 
markets. A La Porta et al.(1998a) appreciation of anti-director rights has been replaced by a 
measure of shareholder protection through securities laws (La Porta et al., 2006) and by another 
indicator of shareholder protection from self-dealing by corporate insiders via corporate 
law(Djankov et al., 2008). As endogenous  variables, these studies use such proxies as dividend 
payouts (La Porta et al., 2000a), the ratio  of stock market capitalization to GDP, the voting 
premium, the pace of public offering activity(Dyck and Zingales,2004), Tobin’s Q(La Porta et 
al., 2002) and ownership dispersion(La Porta et al.,1999a). Forecast for each of these variables 
result from standard agency model of corporate governance in which investor protection guides 
external finance (Shleifer & Wolfenzon, 2002). Another set of literature in this category looks at 
creditor rights. An example is the La Porta et al.(1997,1998a) measure from bankruptcy law that 
have been updated by Djankov et al.(2007) who also investigate several subjective assessments 
of the quality of private debt markets. La Porta et al. (2002) focus on the state involvement in 
financial markets by investigating government ownership of banks. Djankov et al.(2006) use a 
different approach to creditor protection by looking at the actual efficiency of debt enforcement, 
as measured by creditor recovery rates in a hypothetical case of a firm that is insolvent. This later 
studies assess the common criticism that, it is law-enforcement rather that rules of books, which 
count in investor protection by involving legal rules and features of efficiency measure.  
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 All these strands help elucidate why legal origins play a role in financial development 
and growth. To fully grasp the imperative of the investment dimension of our paper, it is 
worthwhile examining the current scope of the law-finance (growth) nexus. 
 
1.3 The scope of the law-finance nexus 
 The motivation of our paper necessitates the scope of literature on the law-finance nexus 
to be classified into four strands.  
 The first strand involves of a growing body of work which suggests that cross-country 
variances in legal origin explain cross-country variations in financial development. La Porta at 
al.(1997,1998ab) pioneered this strand and ever since, many an author have joined them in the 
assertion that English common-law countries have better prospects for financial development 
than their French civil-law counter-parts. They postulate that countries with common-law 
legacies (French civil-law origins) breed conditions for the strongest (weakest) legal protection 
to creditors and shareholders (La Porta et al., 1998ab, 2000ab). The advantage common-law 
countries have over those with civil-law has been extended to other aspects of government and 
management: better institutions with less corrupt governments (La Porta et al., 1999b), more 
informative accounting standards (La Porta et al., 1998b) ,more efficient courts(Djankov et al., 
2003b). Whereas this strand has been largely focused on understanding “if” legal-origins count 
in financial development, the concern of “why” legal origins matter (as highlighted in Section 
2.1) constitute the second strand.  
 Among studies indentified in this second strand, to avoid monotony we shall lay 
emphasis on one very important contribution to the literature not highlighted in Section 2.1. 
Beck et al.(2003) illuminate the issue of “why” legal origin matter in financial development by 
empirically investigating two channel-oriented theories. The political channel examines how 
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legal traditions differ in the priority they attribute to the rights of individual investors vis-à-vis 
the state. It follows that, championing investors rights should bring about better conditions for 
financial development.  The adaptability channel posits legal traditions vary in their capacity to 
adapt to changing business conditions. Thus, countries in which legal systems provide for 
adjustments with regard to varying and evolving circumstances should naturally be rewarded 
with higher levels of financial development. In a node shell, this strand sheds some light on the 
“why” puzzle in asserting that, legal origins matter in financial development because, 
traditionally legal origins differ in their ability to adjust and adapt efficiently to changing and 
evolving economic circumstances.  
 In the third strand we find literature underlining the law-finance (growth) nexus which is 
primarily based on the positive finance-led-growth nexus (McKinnon, 1973). This thesis is 
shared at country level (King & Levine, 1993; Levine & Zervos, 1998; Allen et al., 2005), as 
well as at industry and firm levels (Jayaratne & Strahan, 1996; Rajan & Zingales, 1998). 
Therefore we find significant evidence of the link among law, finance and economic growth at 
firm, industry and country levels (Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1998; Beck & Levine, 2002). 
 The fourth strand which is focused on African countries is pioneered by the 
Mundell(1972) conjecture, which theorized  that Anglophone countries shaped by British 
activism and openness(to experiment) would naturally be rewarded with higher levels of 
financial development than their French counterparts( shaped by Francophone reliance on 
monetary stability and automaticity)3. Very recent findings have either wholly (Agbor, 2011) or 
partially (Asongu, 2011a) confirmed the post-colonial edge of English common-law over French 
                         
3
 “The French and English traditions in monetary theory and history have been different… The French tradition has 
stressed the passive nature of monetary policy and the importance of exchange stability with convertibility; stability 
has been achieved at the expense of institutional development and monetary experience. The British countries by 
opting for monetary independence have sacrificed stability, but gained monetary experience and better developed 
monetary institutions.”(Mundell, 1972; pp.42-43). 
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civil-law legal systems in growth and finance prospects respectively4. From a historical view-
point, the division of sub-Saharan Africa into British and French spheres in the 19th century 
resulted in the implementation of different colonial policies5. An important finding in Asongu 
(2011a)6 debunked the dominance English common-law countries in prospects of financial 
development. In effect, Asongu (2011c)7 uses an “inflation-uncertainty” theory to boost 
theoretical validity and empirical justification as to why French civil-law countries dominate in 
financial allocation efficiency. Some emphasis on this debate has also been tilted toward human 
development, with Asongu (2011d) assessing the link among law, economic and human 
developments.  
By virtue of the scope of this literature, as far as we perused the influence of colonial 
legacies on financial development has been greatly covered (La Porta et al., 1998b, 1999b, 
                         
 
4
 While Agbor (2011) examines channels via which legal-origin affects economic performance, Asongu (2011a) 
proposes four theories in assessing why legal-origin matter in growth and welfare. Both studies are focused on the 
sub-Saharan part of Africa.  
 
5
 The British and French implemented two very distinct colonial policies. Wheras the French imposed a highly 
centralized bureaucratic system that clearly underlined empire-building, the British administered decentralized, 
flexible and pragmatic policies. Economic prospects dominated British colonial activities who sought to transform 
their colonies into commercially viable trading partners through the indirect-rule: producing raw material and 
consuming British manufactures. The French on the other hand propagated imperial ambitions through the policy of 
assimilation.  
 
6
 “This paper proposes and empirically validates four theories of why legal origin influences growth and welfare 
through finance. It is a natural extension of “Law and finance: why does legal origin matter?” by Thorsten Beck, 
Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine (2003). We find only partial support for the Mundell(1972), La Porta et al. 
(1998b) and Beck et al.(2003) hypotheses that English common-law countries tend to have better developed 
financial intermediaries than French civil-law countries. While countries with English legal tradition have legal 
systems that improve financial depth, activity and size, countries with French legal origin overwhelmingly dominate 
in financial intermediary allocation efficiency. Countries with Portuguese legal origin fall in-between”. 
Asongu(2011a, p.1)  
 
7
 The dominance of English common-law countries in prospects for financial development in the legal-origins 
debate has been debunked by recent findings. Using exchange rate regimes and economic/monetary integration 
oriented hypotheses, this paper proposes an “inflation uncertainty theory” in providing theoretical justification and 
empirical validity as to why French civil-law countries have higher levels of financial allocation efficiency. Inflation 
uncertainty, typical of floating exchange rate regimes accounts for the allocation inefficiency of financial 
intermediary institutions in English common-law countries. As a policy implication, results support the benefits of 
fixed exchange rate regimes in financial intermediary allocation efficiency.(2011c,p.1) 
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2000b; Djankov, 2003b; Beck et al., 2003). However the imperative of investment to developing 
countries (with regard to the African continent) remains a missing component in the legal origins 
debate. A reason for this missing link could be traced to scanty statistics on law measures in the 
African continent a decade past. Thus, the added appeal of this paper is its use of novel data 
collected after pioneering works on the law-finance nexus to assess hypotheses resulting there-
from. A reassessment of these hypotheses within this specific context, using much recent data 
and different dynamics in line with Asongu (2011ab) could set new paradigms in this legal 
origins debate. Investment undoubtedly remains a critical determinant of growth and 
development in the continent. The concern addressed in this paper is the importance of legal 
origins in explaining cross-country differences in law factors that are exogenous to aggregate 
investment dynamics. In plainer terms this paper seeks to explore how legal origins affect 
domestic, foreign, private and public investments through law channels. The work contributes to 
the law-finance (growth) literature by providing a hitherto unexplored dimension of the Legal 
Origins Theory. In accordance with the amendment of law over time hypothesis(La Porta et 
al.,1998b), the new approach of classifying legal origins into English, French, French sub-
Saharan African, Portuguese and North African countries provides an exhaustive and thorough 
insight into an African view of the legal origin debate: hitherto unexplored.   
 
2. Law channels and investment theory   
2.1 Regulatory quality 
 Consistent with the World Bank as expressed by Asongu (2011b), this paper postulates 
that in the regulatory-quality channel, a legal system that allows for independent bodies that set-
up rules, oversee them and sanction those who fail to respect them is more likely to create 
favorable conditions for investment. This hypothesis is premised on the fact that the business of 
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government is not the government of business and thus the power the government exerts in 
business activities is largely limited by the presence of independent bodies that check the organs 
of power. Traditionally, most French civil-law countries are characterized by little 
decentralization, absence of federations, no senates at the parliamentary level, appointment of 
judges and governors by the central government…etc, which greatly inhibits the powers of 
regulatory organs. Conversely, regulatory organs in English common-law countries are not 
appointed by government and thus not object of allegiance to political powers that be. This 
independence provides some guarantee for greater regulatory quality. In accordance with the 
law-investment theory (La Porta et al., 1998b; Beck et al., 2003), Anglophone countries should 
benefit more from foreign, domestic and private investments.  The paper supposes that public 
investment depends on factors beyond legal origins. We assume public investment depends on 
the political ideology of powers that be; who could be socialists, capitalists, technocrats, 
autocrats, left-wingers, right-wingers, far left-wingers, far right-wingers…etc.  
 
2.2 Rule of law 
 
 Borrowing from Asongu (2011b), the rule of law channel holds that legal traditions differ 
in their emphasis on law vis-à-vis the rights of the state and those of private property. Whereas 
countries with civil-law origin provide for legal systems that tend to emphasize the rights of the 
state at the expense of those of private property, common-law traditions do the contrary. This 
provides favorable conditions for investments especially private investment. As emphasized by 
Beck et al. (2003), a powerful state would interfere in financial markets and create adverse 
conditions for financial development (which is exogenous to aggregate investment dynamics). In 
substance, this paper supports the view of La Porta et al. (1998b) in the assertion that, French 
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civil-law legacies will nurse legal systems that have negative effects on some investment 
dynamics.  
 
3. Data and Methodology  
 
3.1 Data 
 
 We examine a sample of 38 African countries with French; British and Portuguese legal 
origins (see Appendix 1). The data is obtained from African Development Indicators (ADI) of 
the World Bank. Owing to constraints on the availability of law indicators which only date from 
1996, we are poised to limit the time-range from 1996 to 2007. Consistent with legal 
amendments over time (La Porta et al., 1998b) highlighted above, with add the dummies of 
French sub-Sahara and North Africa to the regressions. As emphasized by Beck et al. (2003) 
from Berkowitz et al. (2002), it is important to distinguish between legal origin countries (United 
Kingdom, the U.S.A, France, Germany, Austria and Switzerland) which make-up the legal 
traditions from transplant countries which received the legal traditions. For the interest of our 
paper, this doesn’t pose any issue because legal origins are fundamentally used as instruments. 
For the purpose of clarity, collected data is classified into the following categories.  
   
3.1.1 Investment variables   
 
  Our investment variables consist of Gross Domestic Investment, Foreign Direct 
Investment, Gross Public Investment, Gross Private Investment and Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation. The very high correlation between domestic investment and fixed capital formation 
(see Appendix 2) compels us to drop the later in preference for the former by virtue of its 
predominant usage in the investment- literature.  
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3.1.2 Law variables  
 
a) Regulatory Quality  
 
 In accordance with the World Bank, the quality of regulation captures perceptions on the  
 
ability of the government to formulate and implement sound regulations and policies that foster 
private sector development. The concept is appreciated from both representative8 and non-
representative9 sources. The indicator is measured in percentile rank from 0 to 100.   
 
b) Rule of Law 
 
 This measure captures perceptions on the extent to which agents abide by and have 
confidence in the rules of society, and in particular the quality of property rights, the police, the 
courts, contract enforcement, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Like regulatory 
quality, it is also measured in percentile rank from 0 to 100 through a plethora of variables from 
representative10 and non-representative11 sources. 
                         
8
 Representative sources include: unfair competitive practices, price controls, discriminatory tariffs, discriminatory 
taxes, excessive protections, burden of administrative regulations, ease of market entry for new firms, competition 
between businesses, distortional tax system, import barrier, cost of tariffs as obstacle to growth, degree of 
competition in local market, ease of starting a company, laxity of anti-monopoly policy, how  ineffective 
environmental regulations hurt competitiveness, foreign investment nature, banking & Finance,  administered prices 
and market prices, regulation arrangements ,investment profiles, tax effectiveness, efficiency of  the country’s tax 
collection system, degree of clarity and transparency in rules, and  assessment of the quality of business laws. 
 
9
 Non-representative sources include: trade policy, business regulatory environment, problematic nature of tax 
regulations for the growth in business, problematic nature of customs and trade regulations for growth in business, 
competition, price liberalization, conditions for rural financial services development, investment climate in rural 
businesses, access to agricultural input and produce markets, business regulatory environment, trade policy, how  
protectionism in the  country affects affect fairness of competition, how price control affect pricing of products of 
industries, access to capital market(foreign and domestic),  trade & foreign exchange system, competition policy 
how ease of doing business is not a competitive advantage for the country, freedom of foreign investors to acquire 
control in domestic companies, how public sector contracts are sufficiently open to foreign bidders, non distortional  
nature of  real personal taxes, non distortional nature of real corporate, how banking regulation hinders 
competitiveness, how labor regulations hinder business activities, impairment of economic development by 
subsidies, ease to start business. 
10
 Representative sources include: violent crime, organized crime, fairness of the judicial process, enforcement of 
contracts, speediness of judicial process, confiscation/expropriation, intellectual property rights protection, private 
property protection, cost of common crimes on business, cost of organized crime on business, pervasiveness of 
money laundering through banks, effectiveness of police, independence of the judiciary from political influence of 
government(citizens or firms), efficiency of legal framework to challenge the legality of government action, rate of 
victimization of crime, strength of intellectual property protection, strength of financial assets protection,  rate of 
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 On a positive note, the two measures incorporate the four indicators considered by Beck 
et al. (2003) in theorizing the adaptability and political channels of law. Beyond this truism, our 
indicators reflect a plethora of variables mentioned on the footnotes pertaining to their 
definitions and elucidations above. 
 
3.1.3 Instrumental variables  
 
  This paper examines traditional legal origin dummies for the French, English, and North 
African countries. As we must have earlier emphasized sub-Saharan African (SSA) and North 
African dummies are added in a bid to improve our contribution to the literature. But for the high 
correlation (of about 85%) between French and Francophone sub-Saharan Africa the dummies 
collectively represent quit distinct information or variability (see Appendix 2).  
 
3.1.4 Control variables 
 
 In accordance with the literature (Levine & King, 1993; Hassan et al., 2011; & Asongu, 
2011be), we control for inflation, trade, population growth, GDP growth, GDP per capita growth 
as well as government’s general final consumption expenditure in the law-investment 
regressions.  
 
 
                                                                               
illegal donations to parties, percentage of unofficial or unregistered firms, rate of tax evasion, confidence in the 
police force, confidence in the judicial system, , independence of the judiciary, respect of law in relation between 
citizens and the administration, security of persons and goods, organized crime and activity, effectiveness of the 
fiscal system, effectiveness of the judicial system, security of property rights, security of contracts between private 
agents, government respect for contracts, settlement of economic disputes, justice in commercial matters, 
intellectual property protection, effectiveness of arrangements for the protection of intellectual property, security 
rights and property transactions, trafficking of peoples, judicial independence, level of impartiality of investors, and  
threat of crime to business.  
 
11
 Non-representative sources include: Property rights and rule based on governance, family fear of crime, family 
mistrust in police, rate of family victimization by crime, trust in courts of law, trust in police, degree of social 
justice, trust in property rights and rule based governance,  accountability of the judiciary, trust in the Supreme 
Court, degree of common practice of tax evasion, , personal security and protection of private property, and 
enforcement of patent and copyright protection. 
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3.1.5 Choice of endogenous explaining variables for control at the second-stage of the TSLS 
 
 The choice of endogenous covariates for control at the second-stage of the TSLS 
estimation method is very crucial for goodness of fit in model specification. These covariates 
must a priori be justified by an underlying theory in which they are endogenous (explainable) to 
(by) the instruments. Borrowing from recent law-finance (growth) literature the paper adopts 
inflation and trade consistent with Asongu (2011c) and Agbor (2011) respectively. These 
empirical assessments are  backed by theoretical and historical postulations which hold that legal 
origin(instruments) are exogenous to the amount of trade because English common-law legacies 
was based on openness(and competition) where colonies were fashioned to be trading 
societies(raw material producers and consumers of British manufacturers), while French civil-
law countries were not. In accordance with Mundell (1972), French civil-law origin countries 
prefer monetary stability (based on fixed exchange rates) over monetary experience; implying 
inflation-predictability which is typical of fixed exchange rate regimes (Asongu, 2011c) is 
endogenous to instruments (legal origins).   
 
3.1.6 Brief comparative analysis from Table 1 
 Table 1 presents comparative summary statistics for the English, French, French sub-
Saharan, Portuguese and North African countries. A close look suggests that while English, 
Portuguese (but for Private investment) and North African (but for Foreign investment) countries 
are above average (data mean) in investment dynamics, French and French sub-Saharan 
countries fall well below continental averages. Sub-Saharan African countries in the mean have 
lower levels of investment than the overall French average. Regarding law variables, only 
English common-law and North African countries exceed the continental average; French 
countries surpass French SSAfrican and Protuguese countries, with the later (but for the rule of 
 17
law)  having an edge over the latest. Countries with French civil-law have the lowest levels of 
inflation while English common law countries (with the exception of Portuguese countries) 
reflect the highest level of trade. Initial findings from these comparative summary statistics are in 
line with our expectations and consistent with law-finance (growth) literature (Asongu, 2011c; 
Agbor, 2011)12.  
 
3.1.7 Brief analysis of tests of difference in means from Table 2 
 The test for the difference in means between samples (legal origins) of the population 
(African continent) show whether differentiating various indicators by legal origins is really 
worthwhile. Therefore, statistically significant differences in the means between various 
instruments across variables indicate that, classifying African countries by legal origins helps 
explain cross-country differences in the indicators under consideration.  
 In Table 2(but for private investment in Panel A) there is significant evidence of 
differences in legal origin means across variables. It is normal that not all tests should be 
significant to justify the adoption of legal origin dummies as instruments (La Porta et al., 1998b; 
pp.1131-1148).  
 
3.2 Methodology  
 
 Consistent with the law-finance (growth) literature, we adopt the Two Stage Least 
Squares (TSLS) methodology as estimation technique with legal origin dummies as instrumental 
variables (Beck et al., 2003; Agbor, 2011; Asongu, 2011abcd). This estimation method has the 
                         
12
 With the exception of Portuguese countries, English countries reflect higher levels of trade because they 
traditionally have legal systems that provide for openness (in trade and capital) and competition: this is in line with 
Agbor (2011). Conversely it is not unexpected that countries with French legal tradition should have the lowest 
levels of inflation. French colonial monetary legacy is focused on lowering levels of inflation because their former 
colonies have sacrificed financial independence and monetary experience for exchange stability (Mundell, 1972; 
Asongu 2011c). 
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particular advantage of addressing the concern for endogeneity. The Instrumental Variable (IV) 
estimator can therefore avoid the bias that Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates suffer-from 
when covariates in the regression are correlated with the error term. More so, the object of this 
paper is to investigate how legal origins affect investment dynamics through law channels; which 
requires an IV estimation method. This proposed approach will entail the following steps:  
-first and foremost our preference for a TSLS over an OLS estimation method will be justified 
by a Hausman-test for endogeneity; 
-secondly, we shall verify that instrumental variables are exogenous to the endogenous 
components of explaining variables (law channels), conditional on other covariates (control 
variables); 
-lastly, the validity of the instruments will be tested through an overidentifying restrictions (OIR) 
test. 
 Above methodology will entail the following models.    
First-stage regression:  
 
++= itit BritishLawChannel )(10 γγ +itFrench)(2γ itPortuguese)(3γ
                       (1) 
                               itaNorthAfric )(4γ υα ++ itiX
 
 
 
++= itit BritishLawChannel )(10 γγ +itFrenchssa)(2γ itPortuguese)(3γ
                  (2) 
                               itaNorthAfric )(4γ υα ++ itiX  
 
 
Second-stage regression: 
 
++= itit egulationQualityofrInvestment )(10 γγ +itRuleoflaw)(2γ +itiXβ µ
               (3)                                           
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In all equations, X is a set of control variables. For the first/second and third equations,  v  
and u, respectively denote the disturbance terms. The instruments are the five legal origin 
dummy variables. Frenchssa: dummy for Francophone SSA.  
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     Table 1: Comparative Summary Statistics  
 
Stats 
 
Data 
Investment Variables Law  Vbles Control  Variables Instrumental Variables 
GDI FDI PrivI PubI GFCF R.Q R.Law Infl. Trade Popg Gov.E GDPg GDPpc Eng. Frch. Port. Frssa. Nafri. 
 
 
 
Mean 
English       23.258 4.362 13.300 7.421 20.732 0.374 0.405 10.484 87.367 2.106 16.141 4.618 2.457 --- --- --- --- --- 
French 19.783 2.183 12.838 6.365 19.359 0.306 0.277 3.317 64.400 2.595 12.799 4.121 1.524 --- --- --- --- --- 
Portuguese 21.410 4.671 10.742 10.667 21.410 0.265 0.258 121.12 93.977 2.199 13.048 6.313 3.807 --- --- --- --- --- 
Frenchssa 18.301 2.049 12.111 6.158 18.300 0.281 0.243 3.370 62.678 2.852 12.133 4.042 1.190 --- --- --- --- --- 
Northafrica 24.864 2.838 14.386 8.382 22.938 0.419 0.472 3.635 66.786 1.456 14.959 4.588 3.104 --- --- --- --- --- 
Data 21.206 3.317 12.964 6.962 20.009 0.330 0.329 19.471 76.842 2.351 14.228 4.561 2.157 0.421 0.473 0.105 0.394 0.105 
                    
 
 
S.D 
English       10.419 5.893 7.654 4.226 9.453 0.185 0.217 15.292 46.021 0.880 5.776 3.787 3.584 --- --- --- --- --- 
French 7.741 4.033 6.601 2.786 7.144 0.148 0.176 8.862 28.709 1.190 4.711 4.317 4.063 --- --- --- --- --- 
Portuguese 4.377 2.520 4.586 1.570 4.377 0.164 0.251 597.18 35.814 0.373 4.545 7.337 7.084 --- --- --- --- --- 
Frenchssa 7.586 4.273 6.665 2.613 7.368 0.136 0.157 9.680 30.228 1.136 4.836 4.586 4.224 --- --- --- --- --- 
Northafrica 4.582 2.523 5.732 3.476 3.307 0.135 0.143 3.066  19.193 0.335 2.573 2.343 2.350 --- --- --- --- --- 
Data 8.958 5.085 7.012 3.561 8.166 0.170 0.212 201.52 39.588 1.044 5.416 4.561 4.346 0.494 0.499 0.307 0.489 0.307 
                    
 
 
Min. 
English       3.480 -5.781 0.272 0.090 3.480 0.044 0.029 -100.0 17.859 -1.075 5.416 -16.74 -17.14 --- --- --- --- --- 
French 4.303 -8.629 -2.437 1.399 4.311 0.054 0.019 -100.0 21.574 0.591 2.650 -12.67 -15.15 --- --- --- --- --- 
Portuguese 18.336 1.639 5.976 8.550 18.336 0.044 0.014 -3.502 36.805 1.456 6.331 -28.10 -29.63 --- --- --- --- --- 
Frenchssa 4.303 -8.629 -2.437 1.399 4.311 0.054 0.019 -100.0 21.574 0.707 2.650 -12.67 -15.15 --- --- --- --- --- 
Northafrica 16.886 0.261 2.402 3.560 16.311 0.156 0.105 0.339 38.362 0.591 10.375 -2.227 -3.591 --- --- --- --- --- 
Data 3.480 -8.629 -2.437 0.090 3.480 0.044 0.014 -100.0 17.859 -1.075 2.650 -28.10 -29.63 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
                    
 
 
Max. 
English       63.757 33.277 43.917 25.008 63.547 0.771 0.810 132.82 224.66 4.233 35.138 27.462 22.618 --- --- --- --- --- 
French 60.156 34.508 49.594 13.716 59.723 0.698 0.610 31.112 156.86 10.564 28.763 33.629 29.062 --- --- --- --- --- 
Portuguese 30.950 8.581 21.718 13.996 30.950 0.556 0.767 4145.1 179.00 3.030 21.288 20.613 17.114 --- --- --- --- --- 
Frenchssa 60.156 34.508 49.594 13.716 59.723 0.698 0.519 31.112 156.86 10.564 28.763 33.629 29.062 --- --- --- --- --- 
Northafrica 33.690 10.464 27.294 15.142 31.294 0.688 0.610 18.679 108.81 1.923 19.351 12.217 10.595 --- --- --- --- --- 
Data 63.757 34.508 49.594 25.008 63.547 0.771 0.810 4145.1 224.66 10.564 35.138 33.629 29.062 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
                    
 
 
Obs. 
English       143 157 153 167 164 144 143 178 192 192 179 192 192 --- --- --- --- --- 
French 208 159 198 203 208 162 162 203 212 216 210 216 216 --- --- --- --- --- 
Portuguese 12 12 12 12 12 36 36 48 36 36 36 48 48 --- --- --- --- --- 
Frenchssa 172 135 168 173 172 135 135 167 176 180 174 180 180 --- --- --- --- --- 
Northafrica 48 36 42 42 48 36 36 48 48 48 48 48 48 --- --- --- --- --- 
Data 363 328 363 382 384 342 341 429 440 444 425 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations. GDI: Gross Domestic Investment. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. PrivI: Private Investment. PubI: Public Investment. 
GFCF: Gross Fixed Capital Formation. R.Q: Regulation Quality.  R.Law: Rule of Law. Infl:Inflation. Popg: Population growth. Gov.E: Government Expenditure. GDPg: GDP growth. GDPpc:GDP per 
capita growth. Eng: English legal origin. Frch: French legal origin. Port: Portuguese legal origin. Frssa: French sub-Saharan Africa. Nafri: North Africa. 
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Table 2: Test of difference in means 
   Panel A: Investment Dynamics 
   Domestic and Foreign Investments   Private and Public Investments 
   Domestic Investment Foreign Investment   Private Investment Public Investment 
   Eng Fr Por Frssa Nafri Eng Fr Por Frssa Nafri   Eng Fr Por Frssa Nafri Eng Fr Por Frssa Nafri 
 
Legal origin 
dummies 
(Instruments) 
Eng 0 3.58 0.60 4.87 -1.03 0 3.83 -0.18 3.78 1.51  Eng 0 0.60 1.13 1.48 -0.85 0 2.87 -2.64 3.32 -1.36 
Fr  0 -0.72 1.87 -4.36  0 -2.10 0.27 -0.93  Fr  0 1.08 1.04 -1.41  0 -5.29 0.74 -4.08 
Por   0 1.40 -2.35   0 2.08 2.17  Por   0 0.69 2.02   0 5.89 2.20 
Frssa    0 -5.70    0 -1.05  Frssa    0 -2.03    0 -4.61 
Nafri     0     0  Nafri     0     0 
                         
                         
   Panel B: Law and Endogenous Explaining Control Variables 
   Law   Endogenous Explaining Control Variables 
   Regulation  Quality Rule of Law   Inflation Trade 
 
Legal origin 
dummies 
(Instruments) 
 
 Eng Fr Por Frssa Nafri Eng Fr Por Frssa Nafri   Eng Fr Por Frssa Nafri Eng Fr Por Frssa Nafri 
Eng 0 3.54 3.22 4.73 -1.38 0 5.63 3.51 7.07 -1.75  Eng 0 5.67 -2.48 5.12 3.08 0 6.07 -0.81 6.02 3.02 
Fr  0 1.47 1.48 -4.19  0 0.56 1.77 -6.17  Fr  0 -2.82 -0.05 -0.24  0 -5.50 0.57 -0.54 
Por   0 0.61 4.36   0 -0.43 4.44  Por   0 2.56 1.36   0 5.47 4.47 
Frssa    0 -5.42    0 -7.88  Frssa    0 -0.18    0 -0.89 
Nafri     0     0  Nafri     0     0 
Eng: English. Fr: French. Por: Portuguese. Frssa: French Sub-Saharan Africa.  Nafri: North Africa.  Values in bold are t-statistics of at least 10% significance level. Significance of   t-statistics is governed by both 
one and two tailed p-values.  
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4. Cross-region regressions 
  
 This section presents the results from cross-country regressions to assess the importance 
of legal origin in explaining cross-country variances in investment, the ability of legal origin to 
explain cross-country differences in the law channels and the ability of the exogenous 
components of the law channels to account for cross-country differences in investment.  
 
4.1 Legal origins and investment dynamics 
  
  In Table 3, we regress our investment indicators on the British, French, French sub-
Saharan, Portuguese and North African legal origin dummies and also test for their joint 
significance. After controlling for trade, inflation, government expenditure, GDP growth, GDP 
per capita growth and population growth, the Fisher tests for instrument strength show that 
distinguishing countries by legal origin helps explain cross-country differences in investment 
dynamics. We find that the legal origin dummies enter jointly significantly in all regressions at 
the 1% level.  It is also worth noting that but for population growth, all the control variables have 
the right signs and enter significantly in all the regressions. 
  The results also indicate that French legal origin countries, on average have substantially 
lower levels of foreign investment but overwhelmingly dominate in private investment. 
Portuguese countries dominate in domestic, foreign and public investments. But for foreign 
investment and slightly public investment, sub-Saharan French countries stand substantially 
below French civil-law countries’ averages in domestic and private investments.  While English 
common-law countries and Portuguese countries almost tie in domestic and foreign investments, 
North African countries joint them only in the tie of domestic investment and have significantly 
lower levels of foreign investment. The findings of the control variables are broadly consistent 
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with the relevance of trade, inflation, government expenditure, GDP growth and GDP per capita 
growth in the investment-growth literature.  
  Some of these initial findings are however not consistent with the law-finance literature 
(La Porta et al., 1998b; Beck et al., 2003) where-in English common-law countries which 
champion private property rights vis-à-vis those of the state should inherently reflect higher 
levels of private investment than French civil-law countries that emphasize state-power. The 
overwhelming dominance of French and French sub-Saharan African countries (Models 3 and 
3*) in prospects of private investment thus debunks this consensus in the law-finance literature. 
Possible reasons for this contradiction could be understood from the following. (1) The time 
series properties of our data. While La Porta, et al. (1998b) and Beck et al. (2003) do not provide 
time spans for their data because such was not necessary (as their studies were based on facts for 
the most part), this paper is premised on data ranging from 1996 to 2007; most probably 
collected after the pioneering work of La Porta et al.(1998ab). (2) It is worth noting that the 
pioneering works had a global appeal for the most part while ours is restricted to the African 
continent. (3) With increasing globalization and economic integration, certain civil law traditions 
might be influenced by common-law traditions and vice-versa. This is the case with civil-law 
UEMOA13 countries in ECOWAS14 (largely dominated by countries of common-law traditions 
of Nigeria and Ghana). This explanation is consistent with the literature on the amendment of 
laws over time. (La Porta et al., 1998b; p. 1119). (4) Another elucidation consistent with recent 
empirical findings could be borrowed from Asongu (2011c) where-in French civil-law countries 
are characterized by low levels of inflation resulting from their fixed exchange rate regimes. The 
corresponding inflation-certainty existing there-in could be the source of their overwhelming 
                         
13
 Economic and Monetary Union of West African States.  
14
 Economic Community of West African States.  
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dominance in private investments. This interpretation can be justified by the negative significant 
inflation coefficient in the private investment regression (Model 3).  
 
Table 3: Investment and legal origin 
  Domestic Investment  Foreign Investment  Private Investment  Public Investment 
  Model 1 Model 1* Model 2 Model 2* Model 3 Model 3* Model 4 Model 4* 
  GDI GDI FDI FDI Priv.I Priv.I Pub.I Pub.I 
 
 
 
Legal origin 
dummies 
(Instruments) 
English 13.850*** 6.052*** 5.027*** 5.358*** 5.794*** 3.474*** 4.767*** 4.465*** 
 (7.140) (4.144) (11.07) (8.174) (3.932) (3.059) (9.003) (8.325) 
French 11.983*** --- 2.527*** --- 7.031*** --- 4.218*** --- 
 (6.829)  (6.053)  (5.090)  (9.993)  
Frchssa --- 6.956*** --- 3.221*** --- 5.609***  4.293*** 
  (6.472)  (3.564)  (6.228)  (9.812) 
Portuguese 13.229*** 9.118*** 5.667*** 6.319*** 4.649** 4.229** 8.493*** 8.841*** 
 (4.923) (3.837) (4.099) (4.113) (2.161) (2.006) (8.087) (8.617) 
Nafri 4.826*** 9.313*** -0.256 1.728** 2.102** 4.683*** 2.173*** 4.660*** 
 (3.802) (6.923) (-0.303) (2.068) (1.973) (3.719) (3.972) (7.624) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Control 
Variables  
Trade 0.084*** 0.088*** --- --- 0.071*** --- 0.022***  
 (7.118) (8.085)   (7.689)  (5.024)  
Inflation -0.082** -0.029 -0.077*** -0.069*** -0.071*** --- ---  
 (-2.564) (-0.908) (-3.840) (-3.366) (-2.759)    
Gov. Exp. --- 0.420*** --- --- --- 0.518*** --- 0.145** 
  (5.598)    (8.403)  (4.942) 
GDPg 0.556*** --- --- --- 0.345*** --- 0.094**  
 (5.278)    (4.017)  (2.338)  
GDPpcg --- 0.621*** --- --- --- 0.331*** --- 0.092** 
  (5.688)    (3.638)  (2.099) 
Popg -0.205 --- --- -0.304 -0.102 --- ---  
 (-0.467)   (-1.101) (-0.290) 
 
   
F-test(for Instruments) 21.829*** 373.97*** 7.062*** 27.480*** 16.084*** 219.66*** 13.502*** 285.06*** 
Adjusted R² 0.301 0.898 0.074 0.346 0.238 0.783 0.140 0.817 
Observations  338 338 302 328 338 363 382 382 
GDPg: GDP growth. GDPpcg:GDP per capita growth. Popg: Population growth. Gov.Exp: Government Expenditure. Frchssa: French sub-
Saharan Africa. Nafri: North Africa. GDI: Gross Domestic Investment. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Priv.I: Private Investment. Pub.I: 
Public Investment. *, **,***; significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
4.2 Legal origins and law channels 
 
 Table 4 assesses whether legal origin explains cross-country differences in the indicators 
which characterize the law channel. This is the first condition for the Instrumental Variable (IV) 
estimation technique which requires that the instruments (legal origins) explain law channels 
conditional on other covariates (control variables). This is expressed by equations (1) and (2) 
specified in Section 3.2.   We regress the proxies for regulation quality and the rule of law on the 
legal origin dummy variables. Due to concerns related to over-parametization and 
multicolinearity we avoid using the French and French sub-Saharan dummies in the same 
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regressions. We investigate whether the exogenous components of legal origins explain law 
indicators both in the presence and absence of control variables, such that we have eight 
regressions. We report F-test of whether legal origin dummy variables taken together explain 
significantly cross-country variations in regulation quality and the rule of law. Clearly from the 
significance of estimated coefficients, the instruments are exogenous to cross-country variations 
in law indicators. Also the significance of the F-test at 1% level illustrates that legal origins 
taken together jointly significantly elucidate legal origins across countries. Variables that are 
controlled for are all significant with the right signs.  
 
Table 4: Law and legal origin regressions  
  Regulatory Quality Rule of Law 
  Model 5 Model 5* Model 5** Model 5*** Model 6 Model 6* Model 6** Model 6*** 
 
 
 
Legal origin 
dummies 
(Instruments) 
English 0.367*** 0.428*** 0.353*** 0.323*** 0.393*** 0.354*** 0.381*** 0.245*** 
 (26.71) (16.87) (24.42) (12.55) (23.88) (7.131) (22.66) (6.800) 
French 0.287*** 0.373*** --- --- 0.246*** 0.230*** --- --- 
 (20.93) (12.52)   (15.01) (4.697)   
Frchssa --- --- 0.281*** 0.241*** ---  0.243*** 0.085*** 
   (18.99) (10.94)   (14.14) (3.062) 
Portuguese 0.265*** 0.387*** 0.265*** 0.258*** 0.258*** 0.286*** 0.258*** 0.295*** 
 (9.730) (10.34) (9.230) (6.424) (7.929) (5.124) (7.748) (6.078) 
Nafri 0.112*** 0.067** 0.331*** 0.302*** 0.189*** 0.137*** 0.376*** 0.237*** 
 (3.818) (2.183) (11.45) (9.804) (5.388) (3.908) (11.23) (6.897) 
 
 
 
 
Control 
Variables 
Trade --- --- --- 0.0005** --- --- --- 0.0009*** 
    (2.213)    (3.579) 
Inflation --- --- --- -0.000* --- --- --- -0.002** 
    (-1.709)    (-2.575) 
Gov. Exp --- --- --- --- --- 0.007*** --- 0.007*** 
      (3.720)  (4.281) 
GDPpcg --- 0.003* --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (1.720)       
Popg --- -0.033*** --- --- --- -0.031*** --- --- 
  (-3.413)    (-2.654) 
 
  
F-test(for Instruments) 11.378*** 8.757*** 313.91*** 204.86*** 22.230*** 21.630*** 243.60*** 210.30*** 
Adjusted R² 0.083 0.104 0.786 0.798 0.157 0.246 0.740 0.835 
Observations  342 333 342 309 341 316 341 289 
Popg: Population growth. Gov.Exp: Government Expenditure. GDPpcg:GDP per capita growth. Frchssa: French sub-Saharan Africa. Nafri: North 
Africa. *, **,***; significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
The results also indicate that English common-law countries have the highest levels of 
regulatory quality and rule of law. Civil-law traditions that has shaped French, French sub-
Saharan and most of North African countries have resulted in significantly lower levels of law. 
In comparison with French countries, their French sub-Saharan African counterparts experience 
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significantly lower levels of regulation quality and rule of law when control variables enter into 
the regressions. Thus the edge of the former over the later is substantiated with control variables. 
North African countries compared to the French (French sub-Saharan) countries have lower 
(higher) levels of law. In relation to both the French and Francophone sub-Saharan countries, the 
Portuguese have a lower (higher) level of regulatory quality (rule of law) in the absence of 
control variables. Consistent with the law and growth theory, Table 4 broadly indicates that 
British common law countries have significantly greater levels of law indicators. This is in line 
with the law-finance literature (La Porta et al., 1998b; Beck et al., 2003).  
 
4.3 Examination of law channels using an instrumental variable procedure 
 
 Table 5 addresses two main issues: (1) the concern of whether the exogenous components 
of law channels explain investment and; (2) whether legal origin explains investment dynamics 
through some other mechanisms beside the law channels. To make these assessments we use the 
TSLS regressions. Thus we integrate equation (3) into the first-stage regressions (first and 
second equations). While the first issue is addressed by the significance of estimated coefficients, 
the second is probe into by the overidentifying restrictions (OIR) test whose null hypothesis 
posits that, the instruments (legal origins) are not correlated with the error term of the equation of 
interest (equation 3). Therefore, a rejection of the null hypothesis of the OIR test is a rejection of 
the position that legal origins explain investment only through the law channels.  In the second-
stage regressions we control for trade (Agbor, 2011) and inflation (Asongu, 2011c). Our choice 
of these variables has been elucidated in Section 3.1.5.  
 Panel A of Table 5 presents results for domestic and foreign investments.  We begin by 
justifying our choice of a TSLS estimation method with a Hausman test for model specification. 
The null hypothesis of this test holds that estimated coefficients by OLS are not consistent; 
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implying they suffer from endogeneity because the explaining variables in the equation of 
interest are correlated with the error term. Where the Hausman test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis (absence of endogeneity) we do not proceed with the TSLS (Models 7** and 8***). 
In a case, we fail to report results because the coefficient of determination (adjusted R²) is 
negative (Model 8**). We also report statistics of the weak instrument test of first-stage 
regressions in either Fisher (without control variables) or Cragg-Donald (with control variables) 
statistics depending on the nature of identification (difference between instruments and 
endogenous regressors). For domestic investment, the first issue is addressed by the significance 
of regulation quality in regressions with (Model 7) and without (Model 7*) a control variable. 
This also holds true for the rule of law in the presence of a control variable (Model 7***). The 
null hypothesis of the OIR is rejected in all regressions (but for Model 7**), implying the 
instruments are valid and legal origins explain domestic investment through no other 
mechanisms than law channels.  With regard to foreign investment while our results are not 
relevant for the rule of law (Model 8** and 8***), they are consistent for the regression with 
regulation quality in the absence of a control variable (Model 8). The interpretations of results 
with respect to the two issues are same as for domestic investment (with the instruments both 
strong and valid).  
 In accordance with the explanations of Panel A, Panel B of Table 5 addresses the two 
issues with respect to private and public investments. While some models do not reject the null 
hypothesis of the Hausman test (9, 9**, 9*** and 10*) and therefore invalidate the IV procedure, 
Model 9*(Models 10, 10**, 10***) validates the second issue but not the first for private 
investment (validate the first issue but not the second for public investment). It follows that for 
private investment, the instruments are strong (F-test: 22.230) and valid (OIR-test: 2.901) but do 
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not significantly explain it (private investment) through the rule of law channel. As regards 
public investment, instruments explain it through some other mechanisms beyond the law 
channels. This result is in line with the hypothesis enunciated in Section 2.115. 
 
Table 5: Second-stage investment regressions 
  Panel A: Second-Stage  Domestic  and Foreign  Investments  regressions 
  Domestic Investment Foreign Investment 
  Model 7 Model  7* Model 7** Model 7*** Model 8 Model 8* Model 8** Model 8*** 
 
 
Law 
Channels 
Constant 3.123 4.152 n.a 14.972*** -10.602 -2.063 n.s.a n.a 
 (0.790) (1.173)  (5.953) (-1.413) (-1.088)   
Reg. Quality 54.469*** 51.967*** --- --- 38.946* 1.244 --- --- 
 (4.675) (4.368)   (1.883) (0.219)   
Rule of Law --- --- n.a 25.916*** --- --- n.s.a n.a 
    (3.738)     
 
Control 
Variables 
Trade --- --- --- -0.030 --- 0.063*** --- n.a 
    (-0.718)  (2.753)   
Inflation --- -0.032 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (-0.160)       
Hausman test 17.362*** 24.822*** 0.793 5.700* 16.581*** 4.659* n.s.a 3.238 
OIR(Sargan)  test 2.901 2.918 n.a 0.881 0.248 3.371 n.s.a n.a  
P-values [0.407] [0.232] n.a [0.347] [0.618] [0.185] n.s.a n.a 
Weak I. Test(F-stats) 9.504*** --- n.a --- 5.518*** --- n.s.a n.a 
Gragg-Donald --- 3.544 n.a 8.455 --- 4.191 n.s.a n.a 
Adjusted R² 0.127 0.115 n.a 0.145 0.025 0.169 -0.001 n.a 
F-stats --- 13.220*** n.a 9.715*** --- 5.905*** n.s.a n.a 
Observations 270 252  269 243 241   
          
  Panel B: Second-Stage  Private and Public  Investments regressions 
  Private Investment Public Investment 
  Model 9 Model 9* Model 9** Model 9*** Model 10 Model 10* Model 10** Model 10*** 
 
Law  
Channels 
Constant  n.a 11.615*** n.a n.a 2.364 n.a 3.233** 6.348*** 
  (8.057)   (1.531)  (2.118) (5.260) 
Reg. Quality n.a --- n.a --- 13.420*** --- 10.383* --- 
     (2.996)  (1.854)  
Rule of Law --- 4.279 --- n.a --- n.a --- 8.938*** 
  (1.038)      (2.788) 
 
Control 
Variables 
Trade  --- --- --- n.a --- --- --- -0.032 
        (-1.493) 
Inflation --- --- n.a --- --- --- 0.023 --- 
       (0.259)  
Hausman test 0.034 3.193* 2.787 2.787 8.529*** 0.760 6.944** 5.838* 
OIR(Sargan)  test n.a 1.272 n.a n.a 8.665** n.a 9.723*** 11.11*** 
P-values n.a [0.529] n.a n.a [0.013] n.a [0.001] [0.000] 
Weak I. Test(F-stats) n.a 22.230*** n.a n.a 11.379*** n.a 2.766** 6.348*** 
Adjusted R² n.a 0.107 n.a n.a 0.014 n.a 0.006 0.005 
F-stats n.a --- n.a n.a --- n.a 4.848*** 4.090** 
Observations  267   284  266 283 
*, **,***; significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. (): z-statistics. Chi-square statistics for Hausman test. LM statistics for Sargan test. [ ]: p-
values. Weak I. Test (F-stats): F-statistics for Weak Instrument test at first stage regression. Cragg-Donald statistics for Weak Instrument test at first 
stage regression.  OIR: overidentifying restrictions. Reg: Regulation.  
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 The paper supposes that public investment depends on factors beyond legal origins. We assume public investment 
depends on the political ideology of powers that be; who could be socialists, capitalists, technocrats, autocrats, left-
wingers, right-wingers, far left-wingers, far right-wingers…etc 
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4.4 Robustness test 
 
 Consistent with the literature (Beck et al., 2003; Asongu, 2011a) we check for the 
robustness of the results above with restricted TSLS investment regressions. Findings presented 
in Table 6 broadly confirm our initial findings for domestic and foreign investments on the one 
hand, and on the other hand, validate the role legal origins play in explaining private and public 
investments through law channels.  
 
Table 6: Restricted TSLS investment regressions  
  Panel A: Second-Stage  Domestic  and Foreign  Investments  regressions 
  Domestic Investment Foreign Investment 
  Model 7 Model  7* Model 7** Model 7*** Model 8 Model 8* Model 8** Model 8*** 
 Reg. Quality 63.436*** --- 64.937*** --- 9.648*** --- 4.759* --- 
 (32.19)  (12.74)  (9.888)  (1.661)  
Rule of Law --- 60.493*** --- 28.478*** --- 9.874*** --- n.a 
  (29.73)  (3.653)  (10.46) 
 
  
 
Control 
Variables 
Trade --- --- --- 0.142*** --- --- --- n.a 
    (4.196)     
Inflation --- --- -0.097 --- --- --- 0.216* --- 
   (-0.431)    (1.749) 
 
 
Hausman test 198.31*** 183.89*** 186.53*** 82.420*** 64.358*** 30.361*** 72.113*** 1.498 
OIR(Sargan)  test 1.540 26.80*** 2.291 27.851*** 7.668 3.561 0.096 n.a 
P-values [0.672] [0.000] [0.318] [0.000] [0.104] [0.168] [0.755] n.a 
Weak I. Test(F-stats) 342.60*** 246.18*** --- --- 308.08*** 306.25*** --- n.a 
Cragg Donald --- --- 5.034 7.815 --- --- 4.861 n.a 
Adjusted R² 0.130 0.209 0.119 0.262 0.029 0.002 0.0002 n.a 
Observations 270 269 252 269 243 242 224  
          
  
 
Panel B: Second-Stage  Private and Public  Investments regressions 
  Private Investment Public Investment 
  Model 9 Model 9* Model 9** Model 9*** Model 10 Model 10* Model 10** Model 10*** 
 Reg. Quality 37.675*** --- 28.652** --- 20.205*** --- 28.621*** --- 
 (25.63)  (2.125)  (26.16)  (3.663)  
Rule of Law --- 36.24*** --- 7.353 --- 19.330*** --- 17.910*** 
  (24.81)  (1.202)  (25.36)  (8.465) 
 
 
Control 
Variables 
Trade  --- --- 0.098 0.130*** --- --- -0.037 --- 
   (1.492) (4.817)   (-1.086)  
Inflation --- --- -0.653** --- --- --- --- 0.045 
   (-2.494)     (0.502) 
 
Hausman test 112.60*** 83.844*** 45.714*** 26.036*** 191.96*** 152.79*** 92.705*** 88.238*** 
OIR(Sargan)  test 10.838** 37.361*** 4.523 33.108*** 7.951** 32.246*** 3.568 38.616*** 
P-values [0.012] [0.000] [0.104] [0.000] [0.047] [0.000] [0.167] [0.000] 
Weak I. Test(F-stats) 358.24*** 259.14*** --- --- 358.24*** 259.14*** --- --- 
Cragg Donald --- --- 1.495 6.806 --- --- 2.611 4.221 
Adjusted R² 0.047 0.111 0.102 0.169 0.017 0.062 0.001 0.052 
Observations 268 267 250 267 284 283 284 265 
*, **,***; significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. (): z-statistics. Chi-square statistics for Hausman test. LM statistics for Sargan test. [ ]: p-
values. Weak I. Test (F-stats): F-statistics for Weak Instrument test at first stage regression. Cragg-Donald statistics for Weak Instrument test at first 
stage regression. OIR: overidentifying restrictions. Reg: Regulation. 
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In accordance with the explanatory framework outlined above, the robustness test 
assesses the two main issues: (1) whether the exogenous components of law indicators explain 
investment dynamics and; (2) if legal origins explain investment dynamics beyond the 
mechanism of law channels. 
Rejection of the null hypothesis of the Hausman test in fifteen of the sixteen regressions 
justifies our TSLS estimation method. The first issue is resolved by the significance of estimated 
coefficients in most of the regressions. With regard the second concern, failure to reject the null 
hypothesis of the OIR test in at least one of the four regressions pertaining to each investment 
dynamic provides further evidence for the validity of the instruments. In plainer terms, the 
instruments do not always suffer from endogeneity and thus explain investment through no other 
channels than law indicators. The robustness test results run-counter to our earlier finding that 
legal origins explain public investment beyond law channels. Thus the role of autonomous 
investment (restricted TSLS or not) in this inconsistency could be object of further research.  
   
5. Conclusion 
 
 In this paper we have analyzed how legal origins affect aggregate investment dynamics 
through law channels of regulation quality and the rule of law. The analysis suggests the 
following four specific findings.  
  Firstly, contrary to mainstream consensus that English common-law countries will 
naturally benefit from higher levels of private investment because their legal systems provide an 
appealing atmosphere(championing of private property rights, vis-à-vis, those of the state) for 
private sector development  (La Porta et al., 1998b, 1999b; Beck et al., 2003), French civil-law 
countries overwhelmingly dominate in aggregate private investment. Possible reasons for this 
contradiction could be understood from the following. (1) The time series properties of our data. 
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While La Porta, et al. (1998b) and Beck et al. (2003) do not provide time spans for their data 
because such was not necessary (as their studies were based on facts for the most part), this 
paper is premised on data ranging from 1996 to 2007; most probably collected after the 
pioneering work of La Porta et al.(1998ab). (2) It is worth noting that the pioneering works had a 
global appeal for the most part while ours is restricted to the African continent. (3) With 
increasing globalization and economic integration, certain civil law traditions might be 
influenced by common-law traditions and vice-versa. This is the case with civil-law UEMOA 
countries in ECOWAS (largely dominated by countries of common-law traditions like Nigeria 
and Ghana). This explanation is in accordance with the literature on the amendment of laws over 
time. (La Porta et al., 1998b; p. 1119). (4) Another elucidation consistent with recent empirical 
findings could be borrowed from Asongu (2011c) where-in, French civil-law countries are 
characterized by low levels of inflation resulting from their fixed exchange rate regimes. The 
corresponding inflation-certainty existing there-in could be the source of their overwhelming 
dominance in private investments. This interpretation can be justified by the negative significant 
inflation coefficients in private investment regressions.  
 Secondly, distinguishing African countries by legal origins helps explain cross-country 
differences in aggregate investment dynamics through law channels of regulation quality and the 
rule of law; with the effect of the former greater than that of the later. 
 Thirdly, we find partial support for the hypothesis that, legal origins explain public 
investment beyond law channels.  
 Lastly, results broadly suggest the instruments are exogenous to investment dynamics 
through channels of law.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Countries selected for the study 
Colonial legacy Countries Num. 
 
 
English 
  
Botswana, Egypt, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia. 
 
 
16 
 
French 
Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, 
Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, 
Tunisia. 
 
 
18 
Portuguese  Angola, Cape Verde,  Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique. 
 
4 
French  sub-
Saharan Africa 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, 
Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo. 
 
 
15 
North Africa Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia. 
 
4 
Num: Number of countries.  
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                             Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis 
Investment Variables Law  Vbles Control  Variables Instrumental Variables 
GDI FDI PrivI PubI GFCF R.Q R.Law Infl. Trade Popg Gov.E GDPg GDPpc Eng. Frch. Port. Frssa. Nafri.  
1.000 0.524 0.813 0.514 0.934 0.361 0.457 -0.161 0.465 -0.216 0.377 0.190 0.261 0.184 -0.184 0.004 -0.308 0.159 GDI 
 1.000 0.473 0.284 0.559 -0.170 0.054 -0.148 0.443 -0.172 0.319 0.047 0.098 0.197 -0.216 0.052 -0.208 -0.033 FDI 
  1.000 0.092 0.880 0.216 0.333 -0.225 0.440 -0.143 0.270 0.125 0.172 0.041 -0.019 -0.058 -0.113 0.073 PrivI 
   1.000 0.502 0.133 0.250 -0.000 0.241 -0.015 0.171 0.138 0.153 0.113 -0.178 0.187 -0.207 0.140 PubI 
    1.000 0.239 0.404 -0.218 0.510 -0.158 0.330 0.160 0.215 0.076 -0.086 0.030 -0.188 0.135 GFCF 
     1.000 0.794 -0.096 0.047 -0.274 0.189 0.011 0.076 0.218 -0.134 -0.131 -0.232 0.179 R.Q 
      1.000 -0.095 0.233 -0.342 0.339 -0.005 0.074 0.304 -0.229 -0.115 -0.328 0.231 R.Law 
       1.000 0.107 0.043 -0.155 0.081 0.074 -0.037 -0.076 0.179 -0.063 -0.027 Infl. 
        1.000 -0.395 0.383 0.004 0.096 0.234 -0.303 0.129 -0.292 -0.089 Trade 
         1.000 -0.333 0.221 -0.015 -0.205 0.227 -0.043 0.396 -0.299 Popg 
          1.000 -0.024 0.060 0.301 -0.261 -0.066 -0.322 0.048 Gov.E 
           1.000 0.972 0.010 -0.091 0.131 -0.092 0.002 GDPg 
            1.000 0.058 -0.138 0.130 -0.179 0.074 GDPpc 
             1.000 -0.809 -0.292 -0.688 -0.118 Eng. 
              1.000 -0.325 0.851 0.189 Frch. 
               1.000 -0.277 -0.117 Port. 
                1.000 -0.277 Frssa. 
                 1.000 Nafri. 
GDI: Gross Domestic Investment. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. PrivI: Private Investment. PubI: Public Investment. GFCF: Gross Fixed Capital Formation. R.Q: Regulation Quality. 
Infl:Inflation. Popg: Population growth. Gov.E: Government Expenditure. GDPg: GDP growth. GDPpcg:GDP per capita growth. Eng: English legal origin. Frch: French legal origin. Port: 
Portuguese legal origin. Frssa: French sub-Saharan Africa. Nafri: North Africa. 
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